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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JUNE TRAPP,

)
)
)

APPELLEE'S RESPONSIVE
BRIEF

vs.

)

Case No. 900485

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,

)

Priority No. 14(b)

Plaintiff/Appellant,

Defendant/Appellee.

)
JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
Annotated 78-2-2(3)(j).

Utah Code

Appellant appealed to this Court from an

Order granting Summary Judgment in favor of Appellee dated
September 25, 1990.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Does Salt Lake City have a "special relationship" with

each member of the public, including Plaintiff Trapp, creating a
special duty of care to everyone who travels upon City sidewalks?
2.

Are decisions by Salt Lake City officials on how and

where to expend scarce resources on sidewalk repair discretionary
functions to which governmental immunity attaches?
3.

Is Salt Lake City strictly liable for all sidewalk trip

and fall accidents, whether the City has actual notice of a
sidewalk defect or not?
4.

Can a plaintiff who does not know what caused her to

stumble and fall on a public sidewalk and must thus rely on

conjecture and speculation to establish her case survive a Motion
for Summary Judgment?
STANDARD FOR REVIEW
Upon review of a grant of the Motion for Summary Judgment,
this Court applies the same standard as that applied by the trial
court.

Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977); Briggs v.

Hoicomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct.App. 1987).

This Court reviews

the legal conclusions made by the District Court for legal
correctness. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff June Trapp (hereafter "Trapp") filed the Complaint
herein June 26, 1989, alleging, inter alia, that Defendant Salt
Lake City Corporation (hereafter "City") was liable for injuries
sustained when Trapp fell on a City sidewalk.

(Record on Appeal,

hereafter "R," 2). The City answered, denying liability for
Trapp's alleged injuries (R. 14) and, after the completion of
some discovery (Interrogatories, plaintiff's deposition) moved
the District Court for Summary Judgment on June 19, 1990.

(R.

25).
The City's Motion for Summary Judgment was based on several
legal points.

The City's primary argument was that it owed no

duty of care to Plaintiff under the "Public Duty Doctrine," most
recently addressed by this Court in the case of Ferree v. State
of Utah, 748 P.2d 147 (Utah 1989).

(R. 32-34).

The City also

contended that it had statutory immunity regarding the alleged
causes of action and regarding the discretionary functions of
2

funding and scheduling sidewalk repair.

(R. 32-34).

The City

further argued that Plaintiff was the only negligent party in the
action, and that Plaintiff's alleged damages were based purely on
speculation and conjecture.

(R. 39-42).

Trapp's opposition argued that sufficient disputed facts
existed to preclude Summary Judgment.
53).

(See, generally, R. 42-

In support of that contention, Trapp filed an Affidavit by

Trapp's son, based in part on hearsay statements regarding
Trapp's accident and also on a post-accident examination of an
area of sidewalk designated by Trapp as one in which she believed
she could have tripped.

(R. 54-58).

Trapp also argued that the

City's reliance on the public duty doctrine was misplaced,
although she conceded that she had no special relationship to the
City.
The City replied to Trapp's opposition (R. 60-65) and, after
a hearing on the City's Motion, Judge Richard H. Moffat ordered
that Summary Judgment be entered for the City (R. 69-75).
The Court's decision touched all the points raised by the
City.

With regard to the "duty of care" argument, the Court held

that because no special relationship existed between Trapp and
the City, Salt Lake City owed no duty to Trapp.

(R. 69-70).

The

requirement of a "special relationship" was based on the Court's
reading of Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 147 (Utah 1989) and
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986).

(R. 70).

The Court further found that the City does not have
sufficient economic resources or personnel to inspect and repair
3

every potential problem with the approximately 800 lineal miles
of sidewalk in the corporate City limits.

(R. 70). The Court

also found that Trapp, who fell on the sidewalk on a sunny day,
was well acquainted with the area in question, having walked in
that area many times before the incident.

(R. 70). An order of

dismissal with prejudice was entered September 25, 1990 (R. 72).
This appeal followed, after which Trapp filed a Motion for
Summary Disposition seeking summary reversal of the trial court's
Order.

The City countered with a Cross-Motion for Summary

Disposition, seeking summary affirmance.
On December 21, 1990, this Court granted Trapp's Motion for
Summary Reversal and instructed the trial court to vacate the
summary judgment and reinstate the case for trial on the merits.
Ten days later, the City petitioned this Court for
reconsideration of the Summary Disposition, which petition was
granted on February 6, 1991.
Trapp filed her opening brief herein April 8, 1991.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are undisputed.
1.

On or about May 11, 1988, a sunny day, between noon and

1:00 p.m., Trapp tripped and fell while walking eastbound on the
north side of 300 South Street in Salt Lake City, Utah.

(Trapp's

Complaint, 13, 5; R. 2-6; Plaintiff's deposition, p. 17, 11.6-9,
referenced in Memo in Support of Summary Judgment, R. 31. See
also R. 69-70) .
2.

Trapp had traveled in that area many times prior to the
4

incident.
3.

(Plaintiff's deposition, p. 17, 11.6-9, R. 31).

Trapp did not recall what happened at the time, but

concluded, after the fact, that there was a rise in the sidewalk
which must have caused her to fall.

(Plaintiff's deposition, p.

16, 11.12-13; p. 17, 11.12-19, R. 31),
4.

Trapp did not actually notice this rise at the time of

the fall, but sent her son, who had been out of town at the time
of the accident, to look at the sidewalk at a later date.
(Plaintiff's deposition, p. 17, 11.16-19; R. 31; See also R. 5458) .
5.

Trapp has never been able to specify the exact area of

her trip and fall.
6.

There was no allegation or finding that the City had any

actual notice of any sidewalk defect at or near the area of
Plaintiff's fall until after her accident.
7.

(See R. 69-70).

There are approximately 800 lineal miles of public

sidewalk within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City.

(See R.

69-70) .
8.

The City does not have sufficient economic resources or

personnel to inspect and/or repair every potential problem with
every sidewalk within the City limits.

5

(R. 70).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SPECIAL DUTY OWED BY THE
CITY TO TRAPP, THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER AND SHOULD BE
UPHELD.
In Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989), this Court
reiterated and refined the "Public Duty Doctrine" in Utah,
Holding that a governmental entity cannot be liable for
negligence absent a duty of care owed by the governmental entity
to a plaintiff as an individual, the Court set out the standard
by which a determination of legal duty should be measured:
To establish negligence or gross negligence, a
plaintiff must first establish a duty of care owed by
the defendant to the plaintiff. (Citations omitted).
Duty is "a question of whether the defendant is under
any obligation for the benefit of a particular
plaintiff . . . ."
•

*

*

For a governmental agency and its agents to be liable
for negligently caused injury suffered by a member of
the public, the plaintiff must show a breach of a duty
owed him as an individual, not merely the breach of an
obligation owed to the general public at large by the
governmental official.
Ferree v. State, supra at 151.

(Emphasis added.)

The requirement that a plaintiff show a "special duty" owed
him as an individual exists because municipalities are not
"insurers against the consequences of all injuries associated
with their operations."
at 434 (Utah 1981).

Johnson v. Salt Lake City, 629 P.2d 432

Instead, in order for a duty to exist on the

part of a defendant, "a special relationship must have existed
. . ." between the parties.

Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, at
6

1189 (Utah 1989).

The duty issue should be decided before the

question of sovereign immunity is addressed, Ferree, supra, at
152-153.

Thus, the primary issue facing the District Court in

determining whether Summary Judgment was proper was whether a
special relationship existed between Trapp and Salt Lake City
separate and apart from the duty owed to the public in general.
See Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986); Obrav
v. Malmberq, 585 P.2d 160 (Utah 1971); Christensen v. Hayward,
694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984).
In the instant case, the District Court's decision regarding
duty was easy and dispositive.

Trapp admitted (and has

reiterated before this Court) that no "special relationship"
between her and Salt Lake City existed.

See Plaintiff's

"Combined Memorandum in Opposition," filed herein December 4,
1990, p. 2.

Under the plain dictates of the law, then, Summary

Judgment was mandated.
Trapp has, however, appealed the District Court's decision
on the basis of arguments that were not presented below.

Trapp

first argues that the City is under a legal "special duty" toward
all members of the public, including plaintiff, who may traverse
the sidewalks of the City.

Thus, the argument seems to go, the

"special relationship" requirement of Ferree is met here.

In

addition, Trapp then separately argues that a municipality's duty
to maintain its sidewalks is somehow an exception to the "public
duty doctrine."

Both arguments are meritless.

considered in turn.
7

Both will be

A.

The "Duty" Argument

In support of the proposition that the City has a nondelegable duty to keep sidewalks safe, Trapp cites five cases,
Rollow v. Qqden City, 66 Utah 475, 243 P. 791 (1926), Nyman v.
Cedar City, 361 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1961), Murray v. Qqden City, 548
P.2d 896 (Utah 1976), Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah
1982) and Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987)
Assuming, arguendo, that this position is correct, however,
Trapp's point begs the question:

To whom is this duty owed?

Trapp responds that the duty is owed "to everyone who uses the
sidewalk.

By definition it is a public duty."

(Appellant's

Brief, page 8.)
Trapp then argues that these cases somehow create the
"special relationship" required in Ferree with every member of
the public.

Alternatively, she suggests that the requirement of

a special relationship is somehow obviated by these cases.
These semantic gyrations make no sense.
recognize a "mass special relationship."

Ferree does not
Such a construction

would gut the entire concept of individual special relationship
on which Ferree is based.

Indeed, a "special relationship" with

everyone equates to a "special relationship" with no one.
Trapp's argument thus creates Orwellian definitional doublespeak
that turns "special" into "general" and thus renders it devoid of
meaning or purpose.

The "special relationship" requirement of

Ferree must mean what it says in order to have any legal or
logical vitality.

There must actually be an individual
8

relationship with an individual plaintiff before a duty to that
plaintiff can exist.

Otherwise, the exact result which Ferree

was meant to avoid comes about: Anyone could argue that the
public duty to all is a private duty to him as an individual.
This translates into a form of strict liability for Utah local
government.

The whole concept of "duty" would be turned on its

head.
The Ferree case recognizes and approves the public policy
behind the public duty doctrine:

The public interest is not

served by imposing liability on government or its officials which
would expose the government to potentially every wrong that flows
from necessary government operations.

See Ferree, supra at 151.

There are several factors that comprise this aspect of the public
interest, the most obvious being financial.

Government simply

does not possess the resources to insure that its operations and
programs will be carried out without some risk and occasional
injury.

In upholding the public duty doctrine in a corrections

context, this Court said, "parole and probation programs are
subject to occasional tragic failures . . . but they are also
practically indispensable."

Ferree, at 151. The Court

recognized that government cannot afford to make such programs
failsafe, nor can society afford to do without the programs.
Such is also the case with public streets and sidewalks.
They are a public necessity.

They are also the scene of

occasional failure and tragedy.

Government cannot afford to be

exposed to every potential problem in connection with its
9

sidewalks, nor does it have the resources to insure that problems
with the sidewalks will never arise.
Here, the District Court found that Salt Lake City has over
800 miles of sidewalk within in City limits.

(R. 70.)

Over

time, problems of maintenance and repair of those sidewalks will
arise.

However, Salt Lake City is, and has been, in a budget

crisis which severely limits the financial resources which are
available for sidewalk repair and other governmental programs and
needs.

Given these realities, it does not serve the public

interest to impose strict liability on the City in connection
with injuries which may be connected with sidewalks. See,
generally, Gillman v. Dept. of Financial Institutions, 782 P.2d
506, (Utah 1989).

("Far more persons would suffer if government

did not perform these functions at all than would be benefitted
by permitting recovery in those cases where the government is
shown to have performed inadequately. " Id., at 513, quoting 4
Calif. Law Revision Comm'n, Reports, Recommendations and Studies
(1963).)

Similarly, it does not serve the public interest for

court to second-guess a policy maker's decisions on the
allocation of limited funds for sidewalk repair.

Traditional

notions of separation of powers preclude judicial interference
into executive decision-making.
Here, the public interest is best served by imposing
liability only where a plaintiff can show that government failed
to fulfill a specific need created by an individual "special
relationship" between the plaintiff and the government.
10

Thus, a simple recitation that a public entity owes a nondelegable duty is not dispositive of any issue unless a plaintiff
can show that the duty extends specifically to her as an
individual.

Trapp here cannot meet this requirement.

cited by Trapp do not relieve her of this requirement.

The cases
Trapp's

generalized "duty to maintain sidewalks" argument must fail.
B.

The "Sidewalk Exception" Argument

Trapp's second point presents her alternative defense that
although the public duty doctrine remains the law in Utah, cases
involving sidewalks are an exception to this doctrine.

Trapp

admits that there is no explicit "sidewalk exception" to be found
in the cases.

Instead, this Court is expected to divine this

concept by more subtle means.

Trapp posits that because the

cited "sidewalk cases" co-existed with the pre-Ferree public duty
doctrine cases, the "sidewalk exception" is implicit under her
reading of Utah law.
Trapp's argument on this point is fraught with problems.
There is no language, either general or specific, in any of the
cases cited by Trapp which creates or recognizes this claimed
exception to the Public Duty Doctrine.

In fact, Trapp has cited

no language from those cases in which the issue of public duty
was ever addressed.

It does not appear from the cases that the

Public Duty Doctrine defense was ever submitted by the affected
municipalities or considered by the Court.

In any case, this

Court did not explicitly deal with the doctrine in any of those
cases.

It appears that this is the first case in which the
11

application of the public duty doctrine to sidewalk defect cases
has been squarely presented before this Court.

It thus cannot be

maintained that in any of those pre-Ferree cases this Court
somehow created a definite exception to the rule most
definitively stated in the Ferree case.

Therefore, the District

Court could not have erred in failing to recognize an "exception"
which does not exist.
In addition, Trapp is raising this "sidewalk exception"
argument for the first time on appeal.

The record is bereft of

any reference to this newly-discovered "exception" to the rule
being pointed out to the District Court.

If for no other reason,

this argument should be rejected on that ground.

General

Appliance Corp. v. Howe Inc., 516 P.2d 376 (Utah 1973); Simpson
v. General Motors Corp., 470 P.2d 399 (Utah 1970).

Again, the

District Court can hardly be charged with committing error in not
recognizing an "exception" which Trapp also did not recognize
when presenting her case before the Court.
Trapp's arguments in opposition to the District Court's
conclusion on legal duty are groundless.

Summary Judgment was

proper and should be affirmed.
POINT II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE UPHELD ON
ALTERNATE POLICY GROUNDS.
Viewed in its broad policy context, this matter is much more
than a simple trip and fall case.

Here, this Court must resolve

important issues of public policy which may appear, at first
blush, to be in conflict.
12

On the one hand, as pointed out above, this Court has
pronounced the "public duty doctrine" in Ferree, having taken
consideration of the costs and benefits to the public of
necessary government functions, concluding that without a showing
of a special relationship between the plaintiff and the
government, no duty to the plaintiff exists.
On the other hand, this Court has pronounced that a
municipality owes a non-delegable duty to maintain its sidewalks.
The philosophical and policy underpinnings for these two
positions would appear to be at odds.

If the public duty

doctrine is strictly adhered to in sidewalk cases, it may seem
that a form of absolute immunity would attend the government's
construction and maintenance of its sidewalks.

It is difficult

to conceive of a situation in which any one-to-one "special
relationship" between government and any particular member of the
public could exist as far as sidewalk safety is concerned.

The

government would come away from every sidewalk accident a winner.
If the "non-delegable duty" doctrine is carried to its
logical extreme, at least as characterized here by Plaintiff
Trapp, just the opposite result would obtain.

The government

would be absolutely liable for every sidewalk trip and fall,
being unable to ever relieve itself from its duty to keep the
public sidewalks safe for everyone.

This would, by definition,

read the public duty doctrine out of existence.

The government

would come away from every sidewalk case a loser.
A middle ground between these two extremes must provide a
13

means for a plaintiff to recover without doing violence to
government's discretionary ability to allocate its limited
resources as its executives and policymakers think best.
In order to resolve these apparent conflicts, it may be
necessary to look at a policy picture larger than the limited
determination of "duty" only, and analyze issues of
foreseeability of harm and the reasonableness of efforts to
alleviate the risk of harm.
The best way the "public duty doctrine" and the "nondelegable sidewalk duty" doctrines can be reconciled is within
the context of analyzing the foreseeability of injury.

Simply

put, if the injuries to a particular plaintiff or class of
plaintiffs are reasonably foreseeable by the government, the
requisite "special relationship" would be met by an injured
plaintiff.

If, on the other hand, an action by government could

not be reasonably foreseen to cause the particular harm to a
particular plaintiff or class of plaintiffs, no special
relationship would exist and no recovery could follow.
The first question in such an analysis is what would trigger
the "reasonable foreseeability of harm?"

In order to insure that

public policy is best served, there must be a "bright line" in
sidewalk cases: actual notice of a sidewalk defect.

If the City

is on actual notice of a dangerous sidewalk condition, a "special
relationship" would thus develop between the City and a claimant
injured at that location.

The "duty" threshold being reached, a

court would then go on to the next step; determining governmental
14

immunity (and deciding whether a decision to repair or not repair
a defect upon which notice has been given is subject to the
immunity which attends discretionary actions).
Adoption of the "actual notice" standard is also consistent
with this Court's pronouncements regarding "non-delegable" duties
in sidewalk cases.

Under this standard, the City's non-delegable

duty arises only when the City knows there is a problem.

It is

only at that point that the City can do anything about it.

It is

only at that point that the City can reasonably foresee injuries
to particular people from that particular defect.
It is against the backdrop of actual notice that the
reasonableness of the City's response should be measured, thus
perpetuating a standard in sidewalk cases long accepted by this
Court.

In Gordon v. Provo City, 391 P.2d 430 (Utah 1964), this

Court affirmed the standard set out in the cases of Erickson v.
Walgreen Drug Co., 232 P.2d 210 (Utah 1951) and DeWeese v. J.C.
Penney, 297 P.2d 898 (Utah 1956).

In Gordon, the Court approved

a jury instruction relieving the government of liability if no
actual notice was given or no reasonable opportunity to remedy
the dangerous condition existed.
This standard is also consistent with this Court's holdings
that a landowner is not liable for injuries he does not create
nor can reasonably foresee would lead others to reasonable harm.
See English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah App. 1989); Stevenson
v. Warner, 581 P.2d 567 (Utah 1978).
It should be emphasized that adoption of an "actual notice"
15

threshold should not pave the way down the slippery slope of
strict liability, imposing on government an absolute duty to
inspect for defects.

Such a requirement would not only fly in

the face of the statutory provisions of §63-30-10 Utah Code
Annotated providing immunity for negligent inspection or failure
to inspect, but would open the door to judicial interference into
executive and legislative discretionary functions, violating
separation of powers. Adoption of the standard would, however,
provide a workable basis upon which cases may be analyzed and
outcomes predicted, safeguarding the public's interests in
maintaining a fiscally sound government and in being able to
recover damages where government is responsible for sidewalk
injuries.
Viewed even within this alternative policy framework,
however, summary judgment was justified in this case.

There was

no evidence presented that Salt Lake City was on notice of any
sidewalk defect or potential problem at the alleged accident
site.

In fact, Trapp does not know the exact location of her

fall.

The City is thus without specific notice of a defect upon

which Trapp was injured.

The "notice" trigger lacking, no duty

to Trapp arose.

16

POINT III
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT PRECLUDES
A FINDING OF LIABILITY ON DEFENDANT'S PART
AND THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE UPHELD.
Under Ferree, a District Court should first consider whether
an individualized duty is owed by a governmental entity toward a
specific plaintiff in a negligence case.

If the Court concludes

that no duty is owed, there is no need to make further inquiry as
to whether governmental immunity applies.

Ferree, supra, at 152-

153.
In sorting out "first things first," the District Court
properly confined its legal conclusions to the issue of duty,
making no legal finding on governmental immunity.

Judgment on

the basis of governmental immunity is justified in this case,
however.

Because a District Court's judgment should be sustained

even if a correct basis for the ruling was not specified,

this

Court should review the District Court's decision in light of the
governmental immunity issue as well as the duty issue.

Foss

Lewis & Sons Constr. Co. v. Gen. Ins. Co. of America, 517 P.2d
539 (Utah 1973); Green Ditch Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 390
P.2d 586 (Utah 1964).

Here, the District Court found that the

City has neither the manpower nor the money to inspect and repair
every potential sidewalk problem on the 800 miles of sidewalk
within the City limits.

(R. 69-70).

A factual basis thus exists

upon which this Court may uphold the District Court's judgment on
the basis of immunity.
The inspection, installation and repair of sidewalks is, in
17

an era of limited governmental resources, a discretionary
function over which Utah law specifically retains statutory
immunity.

Utah Code Annotated 63-30-10(1)(A).l

The Utah Court

of Appeals recognized this principle in the case of Duncan v.
Union Pacific Railroad, 790 P.2d 595 (Utah Ct.App. 1990), holding
that highway maintenance and improvement are fiscal matters which
require the discretionary allocation of limited funds.

The

action of making priorities for the application of those funds is
not properly reviewable by the Court, and is properly immune from
legal challenge:
Highway maintenance and improvements are predominately
fiscal matters. Every highway could probably be made
safer by further expenditures but we will not hold UDOT
(and implicitly the legislature) negligent for having
to strike a difficult balance between the need for
greater safety and the burden of funding improvements
. . . it is not fiscally feasible to equip [all
crossings] with the best possible means of assuring
traffic safety . . .
[I]n a tort action such as this, [judicial] deference
to a governmental function is absolute unless waived,
and we do not review it at all under tort principles.
Duncan, supra, at 597.

See also Gillman v. Department of

Financial Institutions, 782 P.2d 506 (Utah 1989).
Section 63-30-10(1)(D), Utah Code Annotated, provides that
governmental immunity is not waived for negligent inspections,
inadequate inspections or failure to inspect.

The express intent

of the Utah legislature is to totally exempt municipalities from
liability for failure to discover any one of the myriad things
x

In fact, the legislature's broad grant of immunity extends
essentially to all governmental functions, discretionary or not.
See Utah Code Annotated 63-30-2(4)(a).
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which may go wrong in the conduct of public business. As
recognized in the Duncan case:
Much of everyday life presents hazards; driving or
walking along the street are hazardous, and so are
stairs, electricity, and many other things, but we
tolerate those hazards because of the impracticability
of eliminating them. In determining whether a mishap
involving one of those hazards is tortious, the
question is not whether a hazard existed, but rather,
whether, under prevailing community standards, the
defendant should bear the responsibility to discover
and meliorate a hazard, in light of the practicability
of doing so and the costs and benefits to society
requiring the defendant so to act.
Duncan, supra, at 596.
Clearly, the decision as to whether and/or how to apply
government funds for the inspection, repair, and maintenance of
sidewalks is a discretionary function which the legislature
clearly intended to include within the ambit of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.

Otherwise, either the government

would be held to a strict liability standard relative to any
injuries which occur on its sidewalks or the Courts would be set
up as a sort of super-legislature, questioning and ultimately
passing judgment on the wisdom of all challenged discretionary
decisions which have been reserved for the executive and
legislative branches of government.

Such a scenario would make

public administration all but impossible and thus must be
avoided.
Gaubert,

As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v.
U.S.

, 59 USLW 4244 (1991), in which

discretionary immunity was extended for any administrative act
"that involves choice or judgment," jEd. at 4247, the purpose of
immunity is to "prevent judicial 'second guessing' of legislative
19

and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and
political policy through the medium of an action in tort."
at 4246.

Id.

Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990).

Frank v. State of Utah, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).2
2

As noted in the "Recent Developments" article of 79 Utah
Law Review 247 (1987), the determination of governmental immunity
under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act involves a three-step
analysis:
To determine whether immunity applies in a particular
case, the Act establishes a three-step analysis.
First, the court determines whether the injury
complained of resulted from the exercise of a
governmental function. Footnote 22; see Utah Code
Annotated §63-30-3 (1986). . . .
Classifying a government activity as a governmental
function, however, does not automatically signal
unconditional immunity under the Act. The Act
expressly waives immunity for specific governmental
functions. Under step two of the analysis, the court
determines whether the state has waived its immunity
for the particular governmental function in question.
Footnote 28: See id. §63-30-4. For example, the state
has waived its immunity from suit in instances
involving negligence. The negligence exception waives
immunity for injuries proximately caused by the
negligent acts or omissions of state employees
committed within the scope of their employment.
Footnote 29: id. 63-30-10.
In the final step the court determines whether the
waiver of immunity itself is subject to any exception.
Footnote 30: id. §63-30-7, -9, -10. For example, the
waiver of immunity for injuries caused by negligent
acts or omissions of state employees is subject to a
number of exceptions, including the discretionary
function exception. Under the discretionary function
exception the state retains immunity from suit when
injuries arise "out of the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function, whether or not the discretion is abused."
Footnote 31: id. §63-30-10(1).
Under this analysis, immunity under the "discretionary function
exception" clearly applies to the City's acts, as a third-step
"exception to the exception" found in Utah Code Annotated 63-3020

Here, then, summary judgment is proper on the basis of
governmental immunity as well as the duty issue upon which the
lower court based its judgment,
POINT IV,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS JUSTIFIED ON THE FACTS
OF THIS CASE,
The District Court specifically made a factual finding that
Trapp fell in an area with which she was very familiar, having
walked there many times prior to the incident, on a sunny day at
approximately noon.

The undisputed facts before the Court

further demonstrated that Trapp was simply not sure of the cause
of her trip and fall.

(R. 31). In fact, it was only after the

trip and fall that Trapp decided she had tripped on a sidewalk
defect.

(R. 31, 54-58).

She does not know exactly what caused

her fall, and has never been able to specify the exact area of
her fall.

(R. 31). The facts also show that Trapp had traveled

in the area many times prior to the accident, and that on that
day the sun was shining and the weather was clear.
70).

(R. 31, 69-

With these facts as a backdrop, Summary Judgment in City's

favor was mandated as a matter of law, regardless of the other
8. That statute creates, under step two of the three-step
analysis, a waiver of immunity for injuries "caused by a
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any . . . sidewalk
. . . ." It is the City's position that this statute applies to
the negligent repair of a condition once notice of a problem is
received and work has been done in response. The statute does
not create a duty to repair every potential sidewalk problem nor
negate the third-step discretionary function exception. The
immunity attendant to the initial discretionary decision on
whether to expend the funds and resources to repair a specific
sidewalk, in competition for government resources for other
needed repairs is not impacted by this statute.
21

issues addressed above, and should thus be upheld by this Court.
Foss Lewis v. Gen. Ins. Co. of America, supra; Green Ditch Water
Co. v. Salt Lake City, supra.
While issues of negligence are generally factual questions
for jury resolution, where the undisputed facts indicate that an
accident is due to the plaintiff's own negligence, or that the
plaintiff's case is based entirely on conjecture and speculation,
judgment for a defendant is appropriate as a matter of law.
This Court, in Whitman v. W.T. Grant Company/ 16 Utah 2d 81,
395 P.2d 918 (1964) held that a plaintiff confronted with a
plainly visible hazard is charged with the duty of seeing and
avoiding it.

If the plaintiff fails to do so, it may be

concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiff was negligent.
In Eisner v. Salt Lake City, 361 P.2d 1114 (1961), this Court
held that a plaintiff's forgetfulness of the condition of a
sidewalk was negligence as a matter of law.
More importantly, this Court has held that where the
plaintiff does not know what caused her to stumble and fall, the
plaintiff's case is based on conjecture and speculation,
precluding the plaintiff from establishing a case which could be
properly given to a trier of fact.

Judgment against such a

plaintiff is proper in such a case as a, matter of law.

In

McAllister v. Bybee, 19 Utah 2d 40, 425 P.2d 778 (1967), this
Court upheld the dismissal of a plaintiff's case in which the
allegation of negligence against the City of Kanab was founded on
the assumption that the plaintiff had fallen on a plainly visible
22

defect.

The Court stated:

The plaintiff alighted from her car alongside the curb
of a Kanab City, Utah, street, and was injured when she
fell over something in the unpaved, weedy area between
the curb and the sidewalk. With unusual candor, months
later, she said she did not know what caused her to
stumble and fall.

Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to anybody,
we feel that plaintiff did not establish a factually
possible compensable case that could be given to a jury
except by way of conjecture and speculation. Even had
there been no speculation as to whether she tripped
over the cement obstruction, she had known of its
existence for many years, that it was in plain sight on
a clear day,—and there to see if anyone but looked.
Id. at 779.
Here, even if Trapp was not precluded from proceeding on the
basis of the duty defense or the immunity defense, Summary
Judgment would have been properly rendered on the basis of the
merits of the case.

The Court's grant of Summary Judgment was,

thus, proper and should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
In the instant case, Summary Judgment was merited on several
bases.

Defendant Salt Lake City owed no specific duty to

Plaintiff and thus cannot be held liable for her injuries.
Furthermore, Salt Lake City is precluded from liability on the
basis of governmental immunity.

Finally, the undisputed facts in

this matter mandate Summary Judgment in Defendant's favor.
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant requests that
this Court affirm the District Court's decision in this case and
uphold the Summary Judgment in Defendant's favor.
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DATED this IfjQ- day of
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Assistant City Attorney
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